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ESSAY




For over three decades, there has been a severe and chronic shortage of
cadaveric human organs suitable for transplantation. The ongoing
shortage of kidneys, hearts, livers, lungs, and other solid organs has
significantly hampered the ability of physicians to bring improved life-
saving transplant technology to patients suffering from a variety of
debilitating and often fatal diseases. As a result, thousands of individuals
die each year because of the failure to obtain a suitable organ in time.'
Thousands more are forced to undergo dialysis and other unpleasant but
life-sustaining treatments while waiting for an organ (or death, whichever
comes first).
It is noteworthy that this shortage of transplantable organs is not
attributable to an inadequate supply of potential organ donors. While
* Ph.D. Economics 1976, University of Florida. The author has over 100
publications with ten prior papers on organ procurement issues as well as a
monograph co-authored with A. H. Barnett on organ procurement that is
currently in the publication process.
1. News Release, Bob Spieldenner, United Network for Organ Sharing,
Deaths Increase Despite Rise in Number of Transplants (April 18, 2000), at
http://www.unos.org/Newsroom/archive-newsrelease_200000418-donornumber.ht
m. The most recent figure available indicates that 6,012 people who were on
official transplant waiting lists died in 1999 while awaiting a suitable donor organ.
This figure undoubtedly understates the number of deaths attributable to the
shortage, perhaps by a considerable margin. Many patients are removed from
waiting lists shortly before their death, because their physical condition has
deteriorated to the point that they are unsuitable for a transplant operation. In
addition, an unknown number of marginally acceptable patients are never placed
on these lists due to the shortage conditions. Id.
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estimates of the actual number of deaths that occur each year under
circumstances that would allow for removal and transplantation of
cadaver organs vary widely, all such estimates reveal a substantial pool of
potential organ donors who, for a variety of reasons, fail to supply the
needed organs.2 A review of these estimates conservatively suggests that
organ donations could at least double, given the existing number of
potential donors.
The failure of the current procurement system to collect a larger
portion of the cadaveric organs that are potentially available has spawned
an extensive literature proffering a variety of proposals to alter the
existing system in various fundamental and not-so-fundamental ways.
Among these proposals, perhaps the most promising is a lifting of the
legal ban on cadaveric organ purchases and sales that is contained in the
1984 National Organ Transplant Act, which would allow markets to form
and organ prices to rise to their equilibrium, market-clearing levels.3
To an economist, this proposal provides an obvious and straightforward
approach to resolving the organ or any other shortage. To many of the
commentators on medical policy issues who are contributing to the
literature in this area, however, the organ market proposal is highly
suspect and has been challenged on both ethical and economic grounds.4
2. See, e.g., Roger W. Evans et al., The Potential of Organ Donors, 267 JAMA
239 (1992); Steven L. Gortmaker et al., Organ Donor Potential and Performance:
Size and Nature of Organ Donor Shortfall, 24 CRITICAL CARE MED. 34 (1996).
These estimates suggest that somewhere between 30 and 50% of potential
cadaveric donors' organs are currently collected.
3. The use of organ markets to resolve the ongoing shortage has been
advocated by a number of authors over the years. See, e.g., Andy H. Barnett et
al., A Market for Organs, 33 SOCIETY 8 (1996); Roger D. Blair & David L.
Kaserman, The Economics of Alternative Cadaveric Organ Procurement Policies, 8
YALE J. ON REG. 403 (1991); Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant
Organs: The Virtues of a Future's Market, 58 GEORGE WASH. L. REV. 1 (1989);
Henry Harsmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 57 (1989); David E. Jefferies, The Body as Commodity:
The Use of Markets to Cure the Organ Deficit, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDY 621
(1998); Richard Schwindt & Adrian R. Vining, Proposal for a Future Delivery
Market for Transplant Organs, 11 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 483 (1996).
4. Many others writing in this area fail to even consider the organ market
proposal as a potential policy alternative. See, e.g., Arthur L. Caplan, Sounding
Board: Ethical and Policy Issues in the Procurement of Cadaver Organs for
Transplantation, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 981 (1984); Council on the
Transplantation Society, Commercialization in Transplantation: The Problems and
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Significantly, most, if not all, of these challenges appear to be founded
upon rather blatant misconceptions involving some very fundamental
economic issues
While errors involving economic concepts may be inevitable in a
literature that has been dominated by non-economists, correction of such
errors is nonetheless necessary if policy discussions and ultimate decisions
are to be founded upon accurate information. The somewhat limited
purpose of this paper is to identify and correct some of the more
prominent economic misconceptions involving the organ market proposal
that currently plague the literature in the hope that the resulting increased
clarity will help to elevate the level of the ongoing debate. While I
certainly do not intend or expect this discussion to transform readers into
economists, the clarifications offered in this article should improve the
overall understanding of the organ market proposal and how it can work
to resolve this tragic shortage.
II. MISCONCEPTION 1: DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF THE
SHORTAGE
Perhaps the most fundamental misconception surrounding discussions
of the organ shortage involves the very definition of the term "shortage,"
and the corresponding measurement of the magnitude of that shortage.
Specifically, several authors writing in this area have mistakenly
interpreted the number of patients on a transplant waiting list as a direct
Some Guidelines for Practice, 2 LANCET 715 (Sept. 28, 1985); Monique C. Gorsline
and Rachelle K. Johnson, The United States System of Organ Donation, the
International Solution and the Cadaveric Organ Donor Act: "And the Winner
Is...", 20 J. COR. L. 5 (1994); Laura A. Siminoff & Matthew D. Leonard, Financial
Incentives: Alternatives to the Altruistic Mock Organ Donation, 9 J. TRANSPLANT
COORDINATION 250 (1990).
5. This is not to say that other non-economic challenges to the use of organ
markets to resolve the shortage are neither non-existent nor unimportant. These
other, largely social or ethical concerns, however, can be (and have been) debated
without direct reliance upon economic theory or concepts and are, therefore,
beyond the scope of this paper. See also Melissa N. Kurnit, Organ Donation in the
United States: Can We Learn from Success Abroad?, 17 B.C. INT'L COMP. L. REV.
405 (1994). Compare Caplan, supra note 4, at 981, with Gerald Dworkin, The
Case for Organ Sales, 60 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 66 (1993), and Janet Radcliffe-
Richards, Nepharious Goings on in Kidney Sales and Moral Arguments, 21 J. MED.
& PHILOSOPHY 375 (1996).
20021
570 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 18:567
6measure of the size of the shortage of a particular organ. Such a view
fails to recognize the crucial distinction between stocks and flows that is
routinely emphasized in economic analysis. Economists define a shortage
as a condition in which the quantity of a product demanded exceeds the
quantity supplied at the existing price! To appreciate what this definition
implies for the organ shortage, two fundamental aspects of the concepts of
supply and demand must first be understood.
First, both of these concepts refer to schedules relating the quantities
bought and sold to various prices paid and received. That is, the term
"demand" means a schedule, which may be expressed in the form of a
table, graph, or equation that shows the quantities that will be purchased
at all possible prices. A specific quantity, at some point along that
schedule, is then referred to as the "quantity demanded" at the specified
price. Similarly, "supply" is a schedule that indicates the quantities that
will be placed on the market for sale at all possible prices. "Quantity
supplied" refers to a single point along that schedule. Thus, the present
shortage of transplantable organs is equal to the quantity demanded
minus the quantity supplied at the current price of organs. Under the
existing U.S. organ procurement policy, that price is zero.
Second, and extremely important for the discussion here, the quantities
referred to in the definitions of both supply and demand are flows, not
stocks. In other words, these quantities are expressed as some number of
units of the product per some interval of time. To say that the quantity
demanded or supplied of product X is 100 units at a price of $10 per unit
is meaningless unless we specify the time period over which these 100
units will be purchased or sold.Obviously, the demand and supply of a
product will vary substantially depending upon the time interval over
which they are defined.
This second point is crucial to understand, as it has been the source of
6. See, e.g., Evans et al., supra note 2, at 239; Teri Randall, Too Few Human
Organs for Transplantation, Too Many in Need... and the Gap Widens, 265
JAMA 1223 (1991).
7. The standard textbook definition of a shortage is an excess of quantity
demanded over quantity supplied at the prevailing price. See ROBERT B.
EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISION, MICROECONOMICS: PRIVATE MARKETS
AND PUBLIC CHOICE 67 (Addison-Wesley, 6th ed. 2000). Relying directly, then, on
the distinctly economic concepts of supply and demand, it should be recognized
that the subject of shortages is inherently economic in nature. As a result,
economists should play a much more prominent role in policy discussions in this
area.
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considerable confusion in debates about the organ shortage and
alternative policies formulated to resolve it. Specifically, participants in
these debates often have explicitly or implicitly confused the number of
patients on transplant waiting lists, which is a stock, with the concept of a
shortage, which is a flow.8 The size of the waiting lists for transplantable
organs represents the accumulation of the excess demands (shortages) of
all preceding periods, adjusted for the attrition that occurs from patients
dying during the specified time interval. As such, observed waiting lists
greatly exaggerate the magnitude of the actual organ shortage on an
annual (or any other time period) basis.
To illustrate this important distinction, data from the United Network
for Organs Sharing (UNOS) indicates that the waiting list for kidneys
stood at 42,364 patients in 1998.9 However, the actual annual shortage of
kidneys is not equal to this number. Rather, the shortage is approximated
by the increase in the number of people on the waiting list over the
preceding year's figure. It is that number-the annual change in the
waiting list-that indicates the amount by which the quantity demanded
in 1997 exceeded the quantity supplied in that year. With UNOS
reporting 38,236 people on this list in 1997, the actual shortage in that
year was only 4,128 (42,364 minus 38,236) kidneys, or just over 2,000
donors, if there is no adjustment for attrition due to deaths of patients on
the list.'0 Note that this number is less than ten percent of the number of
patients on the waiting list."
Obviously, if 4,128 additional kidneys had been supplied in 1997, the
8. See Evans et al., supra note 2, at 239; Randall, supra note 6, at 1223;
Siminoff & Leonard, supra note 4, at 20. All of these articles appear to confuse
waiting lists with shortages. That confusion, in turn, appears to lead these authors
to conclude mistakenly that the potential supply of cadaveric donors is insufficient
to eliminate the organ shortage at any conceivable collection rate (i.e., at any rate
up to 100%).
9. See United Network for Organ Sharing, Critical Data Waiting List
Snapshot by Date, at http://www.unos.org/Newsroom/critdata-main.htm (last
visited Apr. 19, 2002).
10. Id. Not all cadaveric donors yield two transplantable kidneys. Currently,
the number of kidneys per donor stands at approximately 1.7, due to screening of
unacceptable organs, wastage, and other factors.
11. Id. Clearly, this does not mean that all 42,364 patients would not benefit
from a kidney transplant in that year. It simply suggests that if we are to discuss
shortages in a meaningful manner, it is first necessary to understand the
definitions of the concepts upon which such a discussion must be based.
20021
572 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 18:567
waiting list would have remained stable at 38,236. That is, the backlog
would not have grown. Further, if 42,364 kidneys had been supplied in
1998, the entire waiting list that had built up over all prior years of
shortages could have been eliminated completely in a single year. Then, if
that number of kidneys continued to be supplied in subsequent years, an
extremely large surplus would materialize immediately. Of course, given
the backlog of patients on the waiting list, an annual surplus is highly
desirable for some period into the future in order to reduce that list over
12
time. Once the backlog is eliminated by this series of surpluses,
however, a simple clearing of the annual demand for kidneys will be
sufficient to prevent future backlogs from developing.
Clarification of this issue is important, because it directly affects the
perceived ability of any policy change to eliminate the shortage under the
constraint provided by the existing pool of potential organ donors.
Specifically, if one mistakenly views the shortage as being equal to the
waiting list, one might then conclude (incorrectly) that complete
resolution of the shortage is not feasible under any policy option. 3 In
addition, overestimation of the shortage by reference to the waiting list
would lead to a gross overestimate of the price that would be required to
equilibrate the market.1 4 Such an overestimate, in turn, would cause an
underestimation of the cost effectiveness of the organ market proposal.
As a result, unbiased evaluation of that proposal requires a correct
definition and measurement of the shortage as a flow rather than a stock.
III. MISCONCEPTION 2: BLACK MARKET VERSUS OPEN MARKET
OUTCOMES
In a truly ironic twist of logic, some authors have cited various human
12. Id. The shortage versus backlog distinction is analogous to the distinction
between the federal government's annual deficit and the national debt. The
former is a flow, while the latter is a stock.
13. Regardless of the feasibility of eliminating the shortage altogether,
presumably no one would argue that reducing it by adopting policies that increase
the supply of cadaveric organs is undesirable. Thomas G. Peters, Life or Death:
The Issue of Payment in Cadaveric Organ Donations, 265 JAMA 65, 1302-03
(1991) (arguing for a straightforward policy selection criterion - viz, the optimal
policy is the one that results in the largest number of organs being made available
for transplantation (and, therefore, the largest number of lives saved)).
14. For a very preliminary estimate of the market-clearing price of cadaveric
donors, see Frank A. Adams, III, Andy H. Barnett & David L. Kaserman, Market
for Organs, The Question of Supply, 17 CONT. ECON. POL'Y 142-55 (1999).
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rights abuses and extraordinarily high prices that have been reported in
association with black market activities as harbingers of the sorts of
outcomes likely to accompany legalized organ markets. This line of
"4reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would
result in the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibition.
The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently
accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized."
A legal proscription on sales of any product creates an artificially high
market value (i.e., price) as the quantity supplied is suppressed below
market-clearing levels. That (perhaps greatly) inflated price then creates
a strong profit incentive to violate the law by supplying the product and
charging what the market will bear. As with prostitution, alcohol, drugs,
or smuggling, the resulting extraordinary profits serve to compensate
those engaged in illegal trade for the risk of prosecution. Such profits also
create strong incentives for those criminals to protect their lucrative black
market sales from entry by other would-be illegal suppliers through a
variety of (often violent) means. As a result, black market trade, which
arises in response to a proscription of legal sales, generally leads to high
prices and socially undesirable criminal activities.
Organ markets are no exception. The law does not proscribe organ
trade altogether. Instead, it specifies that all exchange occur at a price of
zero-any compensation to the organ donor is explicitly forbidden. The
economic consequences of that proscription for kidneys are depicted in
Appendix 1. Here, the curve labeled D represents the demand for
kidneys suitable for transplantation. This function is likely to be
extremely price-inelastic (i.e., very steep) over a wide range of prices. 6
The curve labeled S, then, represents the supply curve for kidneys that
would exist in the absence of the zero-price legal constraint. At the
present legal price of zero, Q. kidneys are supplied and Q kidneys are
demanded, yielding a shortage of Q, - Q0 kidneys per year. If (legal)
15. See MARK THORNTON, THE ECONOMICS OF PROHIBITION (Univ. of Utah
Press, 1991).
16. The demand curve in Appendix 1 is shown as much more price-elastic
than is expected to be the case. This lower slope is necessary to illustrate
conveniently the point being made here - i.e., to be able to depict the black
market price on the graph. Actual organ demands are likely to be vertical, or
nearly vertical, over a wide range of prices. See generally Blair & Kaserman, supra
note 3 (offering a more detailed explanation of why organ demand curves are
likely to be extremely price-inelastic).
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kidney prices were allowed to rise above zero, the number of kidneys
supplied would expand along S.17 Thus, in accordance with the law of
supply, S slopes upward.
18
Given the demand and supply curves depicted above, four important
conclusions follow. First, as long as positive prices are proscribed, only
Q0 kidneys will be supplied, and a shortage situation will continue to
prevail.19 Second, the zero-price-induced restriction in the number of
kidneys supplied creates an artificially high black market price, which is
shown as P in the graph.'° Third, this inflated black market price greatly
exceeds the equilibrium price, PE, that that would prevail with legalized
trade. And fourth, the equilibrium quantity of kidneys obtained with
21
legalized trade is likely to exceed Q0 by a wide margin.
Legalization of trade, then, would allow the market price to fall as
legitimate businesses enter the market and increase supply. In addition,
17. Id. There is a possibility that organ supply curves could shift to the left of
Q. as low but positive prices are offered, resulting in a discontinuity of the supply
function at Q.. Preliminary evidence, however, suggests that such a discontinuity
is not important empirically. See Adams, Barnett & Kaserman, supra note 14, at
148, 153 . Figure 1, therefore, abstracts from this possibility in order to simplify
the exposition. Such simplification does not invalidate the point being made here.
18. The supply curve of cadaveric organs-including kidneys-is expected to
be relatively price-elastic (or flat). For a discussion of the reasoning behind this
expectation and an empirical estimate of this supply curve, see Adams, Barnett &
Kaserman, supra note 14, at 153-54.
19. Attempts to shift Q to the right through educational campaigns designed
to encourage increased donorship have experienced some success over the years.
That is, the number of cadaveric organs collected at a zero price has increased
somewhat. Such increases, however, have consistently failed to keep pace with
the growing demand. Consequently, the annual shortages have persisted and the
waiting lists have grown commensurately.
20. Technically, P, provides a lower bound on the maximum prices that some
individuals would be willing to pay for a kidney with the quantity supplied
restricted to Q0. Because the organs that are supplied are not rationed to
potential transplant recipients on the basis of price, some individuals whose
willingness, and ability, to pay lies above P, will not receive a transplant with Qo
organs allocated. As a result, black market purveyors of illegally supplied organs
may be able to obtain a price well above P. See David L. Kaserman & Andy H.
Barnett, An Economic Analysis of Transplant Organs: A Comment and Extension,
19 ATL. Eco. JOURNAL 57-63 (1991).
21. Indeed, if, as expected, organ demand is perfectly inelastic over the 0 -PE
price range, QE will equal Q (i.e., no patients will be rationed out of the transplant
market as a result of positive organ prices). See also Section IV, infra.
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costs will decrease as the risks of both prosecution and violent actions by
rivals are eliminated. The outcome is lower prices, an increase in the
volume of trade, and a cessation of criminal activities.22 Thus, the types of
conduct associated with illegal suppliers involved in black market trade
and the prices at which such trade takes place do not accurately indicate
the behavior and prices likely to result from legalized sales. In fact, it has
long been recognized that the most effective remedy for undesirable black
market conduct is to lift the ban, allowing legal trade to occur at market-
clearing prices. Stated succinctly, the cure for black market abuses is
legalization of trade.
IV. MISCONCEPTION 3: MARKETS FOR PROCUREMENT VERSUS
MARKETS FOR ALLOCATION
A third misconception regarding organ markets involves the distinction
between the use of market forces to procure organs for transplantation
and the use of market forces to distribute or allocate the organs collected
among transplant patients. In particular, several commentators have
mistakenly assumed that the former necessarily implies the latter.23 They
argue that allowing organ procurement firms to purchase cadaveric organs
from families of the deceased at a positive price requires those firms to
charge recipients of those organs (i.e., transplant patients) a positive price
for the organs they receive. For example, Siminoff and Leonard write
that:
Although the specifics for proposed market and incentive-based
systems vary significantly, there are also many points of
consensus. The most consistent feature is that of reciprocity:
organ donors should be granted some sort of consideration for
use of their organs, and recipients should make some sacrifice in
order to receive them.24
Not only is this claim not generally reflected in the literature in this
area, but it also fails to make the important distinction between
procurement and allocation policies. These policies are entirely
separable, and markets may be used for either, neither or both.
The argument by Siminoff and Leonard fails to accurately characterize
22. These anticipated results of legalization of trade appear to be borne out
by the evidence from other markets in which such legal bans have been lifted (e.g.,
alcohol, drugs and prostitution).
23. See, e.g., Siminoff & Leonard, supra note 4.
24. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
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the literature on this subject. Most authors who have advocated the use
of market forces to resolve the organ shortage have recognized that
payment to donors (or donors' surviving family members) does not
require any payment by organ recipients.5 Indeed, positive prices for
organ procurement requires no change whatsoever in the methods
26currently used to allocate organs to transplant candidates. In fact, the
current allocation system administered by UNOS could continue to
operate unchanged. The only difference would be that, with organ
markets, many more organs would become available for distribution.
Furthermore, in the absence of a shortage, allocation issues would be
largely moot. The "tragic choices" concerning who should live and who
should die result from the shortage, and the policy that creates this
problem would disappear with the formation of organ markets.
Under the current system, most transplants are covered by some form
of third-party payment-either the End Stage Renal Disease Program
operated under Medicare or private insurance. Under the third-party
payment regime, transplant centers are already reimbursed for the costs
27of organ acquisition, including the costs of removal and transportation.
With organ markets, organ procurement companies could simply bill the
transplant centers at the market prices of the acquired organs. These
expenses could then be incorporated directly into the center's organ
acquisition costs, and reimbursement could remain unchanged. Patients
need not be billed for these organs, just as they are not currently billed for
other organ acquisition expenses. Thus, allocation and billing could
continue to operate unchanged.
This point is significant with respect to the organ-procurement policy
debate because opponents of organ markets argue that this approach
would discriminate against the poor. This argument is a complete non
sequitur for two reasons. First, it presumes that equilibrium organ prices
will be high, confusing observed black market prices with likely market-
clearing prices under legalized trade. Second, it presumes that patients
will be required to pay these prices out of their own pockets, despite the
25. No one, to my knowledge, has required that such use be tied to the
proposal to use market forces to procure organs. See Cohen, supra note 3 (noting
the possibility of using market force to allocate organs to recipients while at the
same time noting the separability of procurement and allocation policies).
26. See, e.g., Barnett et al., supra note 3.
27. Roger W. Evans, Organ Procurement Expenditures and the Role of
Financial Incentives, 269 JAMA 3113, 3115 (1993).
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availability of third-party coverage. Both presumptions are false.
In fact, the poor appear to be one of the principal potential
beneficiaries of organ markets. Not only will donors, many of whom are
poor, be paid, but recipients will face a much larger number of organs
available for transplantation, thereby eliminating incentives for
discrimination that currently exist in the allocation process .2  By
recognizing the distinction between markets for procurement (which
many commentators have proposed) and markets for organ allocation
(which few have proposed), readers can separate this particular piece of
chaff from the wheat of the organ procurement policy debate.
V. MISCONCEPTION 4: GENEALOGY OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Although not explicitly stated, the assumption made by many authors
writing in this area is that the existing altruistic system of organ
procurement was implemented through a conscious, if not formal, policy
selection process. That is, some parties to the debate appear to implicitly
believe that the current policy was selected from a set of organ
procurement options through a comparative evaluation of competing
choices. That is not the case. Rather, the existing organ shortage has
emerged from a public policy devised and implemented more by historical
accident than conscious design. Specifically, the earliest transplants were
performed using kidneys donated by living relatives of the recipients. At
that time, transplantation technology-in particular, the state of
knowledge regarding immunosuppressive therapy-effectively precluded
the use of cadaveric organ donors. As a result, organ transplant
candidates brought the donor with them to the hospital for the transplant
operation. If there was no acceptable living donor, there was no
transplant operation. Consequently, there were neither waiting lists nor
apparent shortages.
Under the living-related donor system, there was no need for payment
to encourage donor cooperation. Kinship between the donor and
recipient was thought to be sufficient motivation for organ supply. Where
it was not, payment or coercion by family members could be arranged
without resorting to middlemen, who are generally required for market
28. Radcliffe-Richards, supra note 5, at 377 (pointing out the irony of the
position that the poor are helped by a ban on organ sales: "Our indignation on
behalf of the exploited poor seems to take the curious form of wanting to make
them worse off still."). Radcliffe-Richard's paper deserves a careful reading by
anyone offering policy advice in this area.
2002]
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exchange. 29 Such intra-family pressure and/or outright payment remained
out of the sight of the transplant centers and attending physicians.
Therefore, a system of altruistic supply made sense in this setting, and
reliance upon such a system did not seriously impede the use of this
emerging medical technology because of its sole reliance on living-related
donors.
That situation gradually changed, however, as new drugs, improved
tissue matching, and advanced surgical procedures allowed for
transplantation of cadaveric organs and improved transplant success rates.
Significantly, this new ability to make use of cadaveric organs expanded
the application of transplant technology to vital organs other than
kidneys. While difficult to pinpoint a precise moment, organ waiting lists
appear to have emerged during the 1970s as transplant candidates began
to form queues for hoped-for cadaveric organs. These queues were
generally managed by the transplant physicians located at the center
where the operation was to be performed.
In 1972, Congress established the End Stage Renal Disease Program.
This program provided funding for kidney patients, including both dialysis
services and renal transplants. Such funding increased the demand for
kidney transplants by providing third-party payment and by keeping more
potential transplant recipients alive for much longer periods of time
through dialysis treatment. In addition, during the mid-1980s, private
insurance companies increasingly began to provide coverage for other
non-renal organ transplants, such as hearts and livers, as these
procedures progressed from the experimental stage to accepted medical
treatments. 0
The effect of these developments has been the appearance and
subsequent growth of an observable shortage of cadaveric organs and the
waiting lists created by that shortage. Despite this shortage, the public
policy inherited from the former days of living-related donor transplants
has never been seriously questioned or systematically evaluated. In fact,
in 1984, that de facto policy was codified into law through passage of the
National Organ Transplant Act, which explicitly proscribes any payment
29. Ronald Bailey, Should I Be Allowed to Buy Your Kidneys?, FORBES, May
28, 1990, at 368. This article reports that one physician has estimated that
somewhere between 15% and 20% of living related donors currently receive some
sort of economic inducement to supply the needed organ.
30. See Richard Rettig, The Politics of Organ Transplantation: A Parable of
Our Time, 14 J. HEALTH, POL. POL'Y AND L. 191, at 202 (1989).
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to organ donors."
Interestingly, the 1984 Act was passed in response to an
entrepreneurial attempt by a Virginia physician to alleviate the growing
organ shortage by brokering living donor kidneys.32  The medical
community's outrage, and its stringent defense of the altruistic system,
created the political pressure that resulted in the passage of this
legislation. Similar legislative action soon followed in all fifty states.33 As
a result, the altruistic system was firmly locked into place without any
serious inquiry regarding its relative effectiveness in an environment of
reliance on cadaveric donors.
Thus, an organ procurement policy that was a natural component of a
transplant system which focused exclusively on living related donors was
institutionalized for a system that now relies primarily on cadaveric
organs from unrelated, and generally unknown, donors. That policy is the
root cause of the organ shortage, and it is past time for that policy to be
examined in light of current conditions.
CONCLUSION
A fundamental reconsideration of our cadaveric organ-procurement
policy is overdue. Far too many patients have suffered and died in the
name of an atavistic policy, which has as its principal claim to superiority
the denial of payment to organ donors and their surviving family
members. This denial has resulted in a three-decade shortage of
cadaveric organs that has caused unnecessary deaths, inflated
expenditures, difficult allocation issues and various sorts of undesirable
black market activities.
In weighing the alternative policy options that are available to
ameliorate or eliminate this shortage, it is imperative that the likely
performance properties of each policy be clearly understood. Rational
31. 42 U.S.C. § 274 (e) (1994). This law proscribes payments to either living
donors or to families or estates of cadaveric donors, stating, in part, that it is illegal
to "knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation .... Id.
32. See Susan H. Denise, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L.
REV. 1015, 1021 (1985).
33. Apparently, not all states explicitly proscribe payments to organ donors to
encourage their consent to remove the organs of the deceased. See Lisa E.
Douglas, Organ Donation, Procurement, and Transplantation: The Process, the
Problem, the Law, 65 UMKC L. REV. 201 (1996).
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policy selection requires accurate information regarding all available
options. At present, the most promising option-organ markets-is
plagued by a combination of misconceptions and a quasi-political
correctness bias that tend to cause various commentators to either
discount it heavily or rule it out altogether. Hopefully, this discussion will
help to clarify this particular policy option and better inform this
important policy debate.
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